

Pratt's Journal of Bankruptcy Law

LEXISNEXIS® A.S. PRATT®

JULY/AUGUST 2019

EDITOR'S NOTE: THE SUMMER READING ISSUE

Victoria Prussen Spears

SUPREME COURT SETTLES DISPUTE OVER EFFECT OF TRADEMARK LICENSE REJECTION IN BANKRUPTCY

Stuart I. Gordon and Matthew V. Spero

COURTS ADOPT MORE DEMANDING STANDARDS FOR APPOINTING FUTURE CLAIMANTS' REPRESENTATIVES IN ASBESTOS BANKRUPTCY CASES

Mark D. Plevin and Tacie H. Yoon

ALL MEANS ALL, BUT SOME DOES NOT ALWAYS MEAN SOME WHEN IT COMES TO UCC FINANCING STATEMENTS

Bruce A. Wilson

FIRST CIRCUIT PANEL UPENDS PROTECTIONS AVAILABLE TO SPECIAL REVENUE BONDHOLDERS

Laura E. Appleby, James Heiser, and Franklin H. Top III

ULTRA PETROLEUM CORP. MAKE-WHOLE SAGA CONTINUES

Alfredo R. Perez and Patrick Thompson

SOLD OR REJECTED? TO BE OR NOT TO BE—EXECUTORY

Candace Arthur and Matthew Skrzyński

STIPULATED LOSS VALUE PROVISIONS USED FOR DAMAGES PURPOSES HELD TO BE UNENFORCEABLE AS A PENALTY BY THE U.S. BANKRUPTCY COURT FOR THE SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK

James Heiser, Richard F. Klein, Stephen R. Tetro II, and Franklin H. Top III

SAFE HARBOR RE-OPENED? SOUTHERN DISTRICT OF NEW YORK REVISITS *MERIT MANAGEMENT*

Ray C. Schrock, P.C., Ryan Preston Dahl, and Michael Godbe



LexisNexis

Pratt's Journal of Bankruptcy Law

VOLUME 15

NUMBER 5

July/August 2019

Editor's Note: The Summer Reading Issue Victoria Prussen Spears	253
Supreme Court Settles Dispute Over Effect of Trademark License Rejection in Bankruptcy Stuart I. Gordon and Matthew V. Spero	256
Courts Adopt More Demanding Standards for Appointing Future Claimants' Representatives in Asbestos Bankruptcy Cases Mark D. Plevin and Tacie H. Yoon	262
All Means All, But Some Does Not Always Mean Some When It Comes to UCC Financing Statements Bruce A. Wilson	271
First Circuit Panel Upends Protections Available to Special Revenue Bondholders Laura E. Appleby, James Heiser, and Franklin H. Top III	278
Ultra Petroleum Corp. Make-Whole Saga Continues Alfredo R. Perez and Patrick Thompson	283
Sold or Rejected? To Be or Not to Be—Executory Candace Arthur and Matthew Skrzynski	287
Stipulated Loss Value Provisions Used for Damages Purposes Held to Be Unenforceable as a Penalty by the U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Southern District of New York James Heiser, Richard F. Klein, Stephen R. Tetro II, and Franklin H. Top III	291
Safe Harbor Re-Opened? Southern District of New York Revisits <i>Merit Management</i> Ray C. Schrock, P.C., Ryan Preston Dahl, and Michael Godbe	296

QUESTIONS ABOUT THIS PUBLICATION?

For questions about the **Editorial Content** appearing in these volumes or reprint permission, please call:

Kent K. B. Hanson, J.D., at 415-908-3207
Email: kent.hanson@lexisnexis.com
Outside the United States and Canada, please call (973) 820-2000

For assistance with replacement pages, shipments, billing or other customer service matters, please call:

Customer Services Department at (800) 833-9844
Outside the United States and Canada, please call (518) 487-3385
Fax Number (800) 828-8341
Customer Service Website <http://www.lexisnexis.com/custserv/>

For information on other Matthew Bender publications, please call

Your account manager or (800) 223-1940
Outside the United States and Canada, please call (937) 247-0293

Library of Congress Card Number: 80-68780

ISBN: 978-0-7698-7846-1 (print)

ISBN: 978-0-7698-7988-8 (eBook)

ISSN: 1931-6992

Cite this publication as:

[author name], [*article title*], [vol. no.] PRATT’S JOURNAL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW [page number] ([year])

Example: Patrick E. Mears, *The Winds of Change Intensify over Europe: Recent European Union Actions Firmly Embrace the “Rescue and Recovery” Culture for Business Recovery*, 10 PRATT’S JOURNAL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW 349 (2014)

This publication is designed to provide authoritative information in regard to the subject matter covered. It is sold with the understanding that the publisher is not engaged in rendering legal, accounting, or other professional services. If legal advice or other expert assistance is required, the services of a competent professional should be sought.

LexisNexis and the Knowledge Burst logo are registered trademarks of RELX Inc. Matthew Bender, the Matthew Bender Flame Design and A.S. Pratt are registered trademarks of Matthew Bender & Company, Inc.

Copyright © 2019 Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., a member of LexisNexis. All Rights Reserved.

No copyright is claimed by LexisNexis or Matthew Bender & Company, Inc., in the text of statutes, regulations, and excerpts from court opinions quoted within this work. Permission to copy material may be licensed for a fee from the Copyright Clearance Center, 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, Mass. 01923, telephone (978) 750-8400.

Editorial Office
230 Park Ave., 7th Floor, New York, NY 10169 (800) 543-6862
www.lexisnexis.com

MATTHEW  BENDER

Editor-in-Chief, Editor & Board of Editors

EDITOR-IN-CHIEF

STEVEN A. MEYEROWITZ

President, Meyerowitz Communications Inc.

EDITOR

VICTORIA PRUSSEN SPEARS

Senior Vice President, Meyerowitz Communications Inc.

BOARD OF EDITORS

SCOTT L. BAENA

Bilzin Sumberg Baena Price & Axelrod LLP

LESLIE A. BERKOFF

Moritt Hock & Hamroff LLP

TED A. BERKOWITZ

Farrell Fritz, P.C.

ANDREW P. BROZMAN

Clifford Chance US LLP

MICHAEL L. COOK

Schulte Roth & Zabel LLP

MARK G. DOUGLAS

Jones Day

MARK J. FRIEDMAN

DLA Piper

STUART I. GORDON

Rivkin Radler LLP

PATRICK E. MEARS

Barnes & Thornburg LLP

PRATT'S JOURNAL OF BANKRUPTCY LAW is published eight times a year by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. Copyright 2019 Reed Elsevier Properties SA., used under license by Matthew Bender & Company, Inc. All rights reserved. No part of this journal may be reproduced in any form—by microfilm, xerography, or otherwise—or incorporated into any information retrieval system without the written permission of the copyright owner. For permission to photocopy or use material electronically from *Pratt's Journal of Bankruptcy Law*, please access www.copyright.com or contact the Copyright Clearance Center, Inc. (CCC), 222 Rosewood Drive, Danvers, MA 01923, 978-750-8400. CCC is a not-for-profit organization that provides licenses and registration for a variety of users. For subscription information and customer service, call 1-800-833-9844.

Direct any editorial inquires and send any material for publication to Steven A. Meyerowitz, Editor-in-Chief, Meyerowitz Communications Inc., 26910 Grand Central Parkway, No. 18R, Floral Park, NY 11005, smeyerowitz@meyerowitzcommunications.com, 646.539.8300. Material for publication is welcomed—articles, decisions, or other items of interest to bankers, officers of financial institutions, and their attorneys. This publication is designed to be accurate and authoritative, but neither the publisher nor the authors are rendering legal, accounting, or other professional services in this publication. If legal or other expert advice is desired, retain the services of an appropriate professional. The articles and columns reflect only the present considerations and views of the authors and do not necessarily reflect those of the firms or organizations with which they are affiliated, any of the former or present clients of the authors or their firms or organizations, or the editors or publisher. POSTMASTER: Send address changes to *Pratt's Journal of Bankruptcy Law*, LexisNexis Matthew Bender, Attn: Customer Service, 9443 Springboro Pike, Miamisburg, OH 45342-9907.

All Means All, But Some Does Not Always Mean Some When It Comes to UCC Financing Statements

*By Bruce A. Wilson**

The author of this article discusses two recent decisions under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code that provide valuable instruction on drafting appropriate collateral descriptions in UCC financing statements.

Two recent decisions under Article 9 of the Uniform Commercial Code (“UCC”) provide valuable instruction on drafting appropriate collateral descriptions in UCC financing statements. In *In re The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico*,¹ the U.S. Court of Appeals for the First Circuit held that a UCC-1 financing statement describing the collateral solely by referring to the applicable security agreement contained an insufficient collateral description. The First Circuit also concluded, however, that defects in the initial UCC filing were cured by a subsequent UCC financing statement amendment.

The U.S. Bankruptcy Court for the Central District of Illinois, in *In re 180 Equipment, LLC*,² addressed a substantially similar issue in which a UCC-1 financing statement described collateral only by cross-referencing the applicable security agreement. After noting that “no published opinion by any court addresses this exact issue,” the *180 Equipment* court also held that the financing statement at issue failed to adequately describe the related collateral.³

SUPERGENERIC VS. REASONABLE IDENTIFICATION

Section 9-504(2) of the UCC permits a UCC financing statement to contain a “supergeneric” collateral description where appropriate, such as “all assets” or “all personal property.” However, where less than all assets of a debtor are pledged, a UCC financing statement is required by UCC Sections 9-502(a)(3) and 9-108 to contain an adequate description of the collateral that is covered by the financing statement. If a financing statement does not contain an

* Bruce A. Wilson is a partner at Kutak Rock LLP practicing primarily in the areas of bankruptcy, workout, and Uniform Commercial Code matters, representing creditors, including financial guaranty insurers and indenture trustees. He may be reached at bruce.wilson@kutakrock.com.

¹ 914 F.3d 694 (1st Cir. 2019) (“*ERS*”).

² 591 B.R. 353 (Bankr. C.D. Ill. 2018) (“*180 Equipment*”).

³ *180 Equipment*, 591 B.R. at 356.

adequate description of the collateral that is covered, such financing statement will not be effective to perfect the security interest of a secured party in its collateral.⁴

Thus, in cases where a supergeneric collateral description cannot be used, it is important that the financing statement reasonably identify the collateral in which a security interest is granted. The importance of an adequate collateral description in a UCC financing statement is highlighted by the holdings in the *ERS* and *180 Equipment* cases.

THE *ERS* CASE

In the *ERS* case, bonds had been issued by the Employees Retirement System of Puerto Rico (the “ERS System”), an independent agency of the Commonwealth of Puerto Rico created to administer pension funds for government employees. The ERS System issued the bonds in 2008, to finance its purposes pursuant to a bond resolution (the “Resolution”). The ERS System granted a security interest in certain “Pledged Property” of the ERS System to secure the bonds. As defined in the Resolution, the Pledged Property included “Revenues” of the ERS System, and the Resolution contained detailed definitions of “Pledged Property,” “Revenues” and other relevant terms. While the Resolution contained definitions of the “Pledged Property” and related terms, the security interest in favor of bondholders was granted in such Pledged Property under a separate security agreement (the “Security Agreement”). The Security Agreement did not contain a description of the Pledged Property, but instead incorporated by reference the terms used in the Resolution, including the definition of Pledged Property. To perfect the bondholders’ security interest, the ERS System filed two UCC-1 financing statements in 2008 describing the collateral as “[t]he pledged property described in the Security Agreement attached as Exhibit A hereto and by this reference made a part hereof” and attached a copy of the Security Agreement to the financing statements.⁵

Subsequently, in 2015 and 2016, the applicable filing office received UCC-3 amendments of the initial UCC-1 filings, each of which amended the collateral description of the initial filings to provide that the bondholders’ security interest encumbered “[t]he Pledged Property and all proceeds thereof and all after-

⁴ In contrast to UCC Section 9-504(2), which permits a UCC-1 financing statement to indicate collateral with a “supergeneric” collateral description, Section 9-108(c) does not permit a supergeneric collateral description in a security agreement. Instead, based on Section 9-108(c), a security agreement must reasonably identify the collateral in which a security interest is granted.

⁵ *ERS*, 914 F.3d at 705.

acquired Property as described more fully in Exhibit A hereto and incorporated by reference.”⁶ The Exhibit A attached to the amended filings contained a detailed description of the Pledged Property, the Revenues and other terms included in the Pledged Property.

The ERS System subsequently became a debtor in a proceeding under PROMESA⁷ and sought a declaratory judgment that the bondholders’ security interest was unperfected. The ERS System filed a motion for summary judgment arguing, among other things, that the initial 2008 UCC filings failed to adequately describe the pledged collateral. The ERS System contended that the initial UCC filings themselves did not contain a description of the collateral, but only cross-referenced collateral that was described in an agreement (in this case, the Resolution), and that the Resolution was not part of the UCC filings. The ERS System further asserted that the 2015 and 2016 amendments, which contained their own detailed collateral descriptions, were ineffective and thus did not cure the inadequate collateral descriptions in the initial filings.⁸

The First Circuit in the *ERS* case, and the decision of the district court from which the *ERS* case was appealed,⁹ referred to Sections 9-402 and 9-110 of the former version of UCC Article 9 (citing the applicable Puerto Rico statutes), which the courts each noted were in effect at the time of the initial UCC filings. Under former UCC Section 9-402(1), a financing statement was required to contain “a statement indicating the types, or describing the items, of collateral.” Section 9-110 of former Article 9 specified that a collateral description was sufficient if it “reasonably identifies what is described.”

⁶ *Id.*

⁷ PROMESA is legislation enacted by Congress that includes, among other things, provisions permitting the Commonwealth and certain of its agencies and municipalities to file a reorganization proceeding substantially similar to reorganization proceedings under the United States Bankruptcy Code. PROMESA incorporates substantially all of Chapter 9 of the United States Bankruptcy Code, which governs bankruptcy cases of municipal debtors.

⁸ The ERS System asserted that the 2015 and 2016 amendment filings were ineffective because they were filed under a debtor name that had become an incorrect name for the ERS System. This argument was somewhat unique to the ERS System and the facts presented. As noted by the First Circuit, arguments based on the correct debtor name were based on a “unique confluence of circumstances” that involved, among other things, changes in the legislation applicable to the ERS System, the use of different names at different times in such legislation, and the use of multiple names for the ERS System in the same legislative act. *Id.* at 703–04; *see also The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico*, 590 B.R. 577 (D. P.R. 2018), which was affirmed, in part, and reversed, in part, by the First Circuit’s *ERS* decision.

⁹ *See The Financial Oversight and Management Board for Puerto Rico*, 590 B.R. 577 (D.P.R. 2018).

While the courts referred to these Sections of former Article 9, Sections 9-502(a) and 9-108(a) of revised Article 9, which replaced former Article 9 and is currently in effect, use a similar approach. Section 9-502(a)(3) of revised Article 9 provides that a UCC financing statement is sufficient only if, among other requirements, it “indicates the collateral covered by the financing statement.” Section 9-108(a) of revised Article 9 uses substantially identical language as former Article 9 in specifying that a description of collateral in a UCC financing statement “is sufficient” if it “reasonably identifies what is described.” Thus, the arguments and holding of the *ERS* case remain applicable under current Article 9.

In response to the arguments of the ERS System, certain bondholders argued that the collateral descriptions in the initial UCC filings should be sufficient under the applicable UCC requirements. The bondholders asserted that a collateral description can be sufficient by cross-referencing collateral described in applicable agreements and such a description communicates to third parties that further inquiry is necessary. The bondholders also argued that the Resolution which contained the relevant defined terms for the Pledged Property was publicly available on the websites of the ERS System and the Electronic Municipal Market Access System, and could be obtained in hard copy from the ERS System.

The First Circuit disagreed with the bondholders with respect to the initial UCC filings. The court held that the collateral description at issue in the initial UCC filings, by only cross-referencing the applicable agreements, was insufficient. The court reasoned that the purpose of UCC financing statements is to provide “fair notice” to third parties and must disclose a minimum amount of information.¹⁰ The court, however, explained that its holding was limited to the facts presented:

Our holding of an insufficient collateral description depends heavily on the facts, where a) the collateral is not described, even by type(s), in the 2008 Financing Statements or attachments; b) the 2008 Financing Statements do not tell interested parties where to find the referenced document (the Resolution) which contains the fuller collateral description; and c) the Resolution is not at the UCC filing office.¹¹

¹⁰ 914 F.3d at 711. The district court decision in the *ERS* case also distinguished between collateral described in security agreements, which can be based on a cross-reference to another document or incorporate a description by reference to another document, and UCC financing statements, which must provide sufficient notice to third parties of the collateral that is encumbered by the applicable security interest.

¹¹ *Id.* at 710.

Although the initial UCC filings contained an insufficient collateral description, the initial filings were subsequently amended by the 2015 and 2016 amendment filings. The court ruled that the amendment filings, which were timely filed and contained a detailed description of the related collateral, effectively cured the defects in the initial filings. The amended filings, the court noted, contained “[e]ach of the relevant capitalized terms in the definition of ‘Pledged Property.’”¹² As a result, the initial filings, when combined with the amendments, were sufficient to perfect the security interest granted by the ERS System in the applicable collateral. Absent the subsequent amendment filings, however, the bondholders’ security interest would have been unperfected.

THE 180 EQUIPMENT CASE

The bankruptcy court in the *180 Equipment* case addressed a substantially similar issue as the court in the *ERS* case. In the *180 Equipment* case, First Midwest Bank (“First Midwest”) made a commercial loan to 180 Equipment, LLC. The borrower, 180 Equipment, LLC, delivered a security agreement in connection with the loan, granting a security interest to First Midwest in substantially all of the property of the borrower.

In connection with the loan, First Midwest filed a financing statement describing the collateral as, “All Collateral described in First Amended and Restated Security Agreement dated March 9, 2015 between Debtor and Secured Party.”¹³ First Midwest did not attach the security agreement to the financing statement.

Similar to the *ERS* System in the case above, 180 Equipment, LLC, subsequently filed bankruptcy. The bankruptcy trustee in a declaratory judgment action asserted that the collateral description in the First Midwest financing statement was insufficient and that, accordingly, the security interest of First Midwest was unperfected. The bankruptcy trustee of 180 Equipment, LLC, argued that the cross-reference to the security agreement alone, without also describing the collateral or attaching a copy of the security agreement, did not adequately describe the collateral.

In response, First Midwest asserted that the identity of its collateral was “objectively determinable” by an examination of the applicable security agreement, which was identified in the financing statement. First Midwest asserted that “the concept of inquiry notice should be applied broadly.”¹⁴

¹² *Id.* at 714.

¹³ *180 Equipment*, 591 B.R. at 355.

¹⁴ *Id.* at 357.

After acknowledging that courts “have routinely held that creditors may incorporate by reference security agreements into financing statements,” the bankruptcy court determined that the financing statement at issue failed to adequately describe the collateral.¹⁵ The court stated that it:

agrees with the Trustee that First Midwest’s financing statement does not describe the collateral. Rather, it attempts to incorporate by reference the description of collateral set forth in a separate document, not attached to the financing statement. The financing statement, on its face, provides no information whatsoever, and therefore no notice to any third party, as to which of the Debtor’s assets First Midwest is claiming a lien on, which is the primary function of a financing statement.¹⁶

Accordingly, the court concluded that the security interest of First Midwest was unperfected.

CONCLUSIONS

Several lessons can be learned from the *ERS* and *180 Equipment* cases. If a security interest is granted in all or substantially all of a borrower’s assets, it may be preferable to file a financing statement with an “all assets” or similar collateral description. In all other cases, it is important that a financing statement itself independently contain a description of all collateral in which a security interest is granted. In addition, if an Exhibit A (or even a security agreement) is attached to a financing statement, a secured party may need to make sure the Exhibit remains attached after the financing statement is filed. It could also be helpful in certain cases, even when using an Exhibit A, to describe the collateral in the financing statement itself and state that such collateral includes or is described in more detail in the Exhibit A, rather than just stating “See Exhibit A” in the collateral box.¹⁷

In addition, neither the *ERS* case nor the *180 Equipment* case held that there is no duty of inquiry for searchers. If a filed financing statement discovered in

¹⁵ *Id.* at 356.

¹⁶ *Id.* at 360.

¹⁷ When using an exhibit attached to a financing statement to describe the collateral, it is important to ensure that the exhibit is filed with, and as part of, the UCC-1 financing statement filing. Filing offices have, on occasion, filed the UCC-1 form without the attached exhibit. In addition, the filing office of a particular state has recently notified certain filers that the office inadvertently discarded, and thus did not file, exhibits to certain financing statements. See *Missing UCC Attachments in Pennsylvania*, https://businesslawtoday.org/month-in-brief/april-brief-bankruptcy-finance-2019/?utm_source=newsletter&utm_campaign=april19_mib.

a UCC search does not describe collateral in detail, the description may still be sufficient for UCC purposes (or a court could later conclude the description was sufficient). Thus, even in cases where collateral is not described with particularity, a searcher may need to perform diligence with the debtor or the applicable secured party to discover the collateral covered by a financing statement.

Last, legal opinions are often delivered on perfection matters under the UCC. An opinion to the effect that a security interest is perfected under Article 9 may depend, in part, on the sufficiency of the collateral description in a related financing statement. Thus, counsel delivering perfection opinions that rely on a UCC filing will need to be comfortable with the sufficiency of the collateral description in such UCC filing, and that such description includes all collateral described in the related security agreement.